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Nassiri v. Chiropractic Physician’s Bd. 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 27 (Apr. 3, 2014)1 
 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – STANDARD OF PROOF 
  
Summary 
 
 The Court determined two issues: 1) whether NRS 233B.135 of the Nevada 
Administrative Procedure Act sets out a standard of judicial review or a standard of proof, and 2) 
what standard of proof is required for state agencies in adjudicative hearings in the absence of a 
specific statutory mandate. 
 
Disposition 
 
 NRS 233B.135 only sets forth a standard of judicial review.  The standard of proof in an 
administrative adjudication is determined by the standard set out in the agency’s governing 
statutes.  In the absence of a specific statutory mandate, the standard can be no less than the 
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 Appellants, Drs. Obteen Nassiri and Edward Johnson, were licensed chiropractic 
physicians in Nevada, with Johnson working as Nassiri’s employee.  Johnson later purchased the 
practice from Nassiri.  An insurance company reported that Nassiri and Johnson may have 
engaged in unprofessional conduct, leading the Chiropractic Physicians’ Board of Nevada to file 
complaints for disciplinary action, charging them with unlawfully referring patients to other 
physicians, unlawful fee splitting, inaccurate record keeping, fraud, and employing unregistered 
assistants.  After considering “substantial, credible, reliable, and probative evidence,” the Board 
found that Nassiri and Johnson had violated multiple provisions of NRS 634 and NAC 634
2
.  
 Nassiri and Johnson petitioned for district court judicial review, arguing that the Board 
used the wrong standard of proofin violation of their equal protection and due process rights.  
The district court affirmed all the substantive issues now on appeal, concluding that the Board’s 
determinations “must be supported by substantial evidence because NRS Chapter 634 does not 
set forth a specific standard of proof.”  Appellants appealed. 
 
Discussion 
 
Standard of Review 
 
Factual determinations of administrative agencies are reviewed for clear error “in view of 
the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record,” or for an “abuse of 
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 By Danielle Barraza. 
2 The Board revoked Nassiri’s license, ordered him to pay 80 percent of the Board’s fees and costs, fined him $5,000 
for each violation, and prohibited him from owning any interest in a chiropractic practice until he regains his license.  
The Board suspended Johnson’s license for one year with conditions ordered him to pay 20 percent of the Board’s 
fees and costs, fined him $1,000 for each violation, and ordered probation for three years to begin once the 
suspension was lifted. 
 
discretion.”3  Factual findings are only overturned if they are not supported by substantial 
evidence, meaning evidence that a reasonable mind could accept as adequately supporting the 
conclusions.
4
  The Court decides purely legal issues de novo, without deference to the agency’s 
conclusions of law.
5
 
 
Standard of proof at administrative agency proceedings 
 
 Appellants claimed that the Board improperly used the “substantial evidence” standard 
from NRS 233B.135 to determine Nassiri and Johnson committed professional misconduct.  
Appellants asserted that the NRS standard is lower than that used to discipline medical doctors, 
and the incongruity is unconstitutional. The Court disagreed, noting the Appellants 
misunderstood the concept of “standard of proof,” first by mistaking it with “burden of proof” 
and second, with “standard of review.”  The Court explained the “substantial evidence standard” 
in NRS 233B.135 is a standard of judicial review
7
, not of fact-finding. Under this standard, the 
reviewing court must determine whether the fact-finder made its decision based on sufficient, 
worthy evidence by looking at the quality and quantity of the evidence.  NRS 233B.135’s 
standard of review applies to courts’ secondary review and not to the determinations of 
administrative agencies. 
 The Court then clarified that the standard of proof in administrative adjudications should 
be the standard set out in the agency’s governing statutes.9  The Court noted that in prior 
decisions where governing statutes provided no standard, it has held that the correct standard was 
the “general civil standard,” i.e., the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.11  Therefore, as the 
governing statutes here provided no standard of proof, the Court determined that the Board was 
required to use at least a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. 
 The Court next looked to what standard of proof the Board employed.  Noting a lack of 
evidence the Board used a lower standard, the Court held that the Board did apply a 
preponderance standard and “did not err in finding that appellants committed violations 
warranting professional discipline.” 
Finally, based on its finding that the Board used the correct standard of proof, the Court 
dismissed the appellants’ equal protection argument as moot, noting medical physicians also use 
a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard of proof for disciplinary hearings.
12
 
  
Conclusion 
 
 NRS 233B.135 provides a standard for judicial review, not a standard of proof.  In the 
absence of a specific statutory mandate for standard of proof, state agencies in adjudicative 
hearings must use at least the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. 
                                               
3  NEV. REV. STAT. § 233B.135(3)(e), (f). 
4  Elizondo v. Hood Mach., Inc., 129 Nev. __, __, 312 P.3d 479, 482 (2013). 
5
  Id. 
7  NEV. REV. STAT. § 233B.135(3)(e) states that the “court may remand or affirm the final decision or set it aside in 
whole or in part . . . because the final decision of the agency is: . . . [c]learly erroneous in view of the reliable, 
probative and substantial evidence on the whole record.”   
9  See Gilman v. State Bd. Of Veterinary Med. Exam’rs, 120 Nev. 263, 274, 89 P.3d 1000, 1008 (2004).  
11  J.D. Constr., 126 Nev. at __, 240 P.3d at 1043. 
12  See NEV. REV. STAT. § 630.346(2).   
